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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES - PROXIMATE CAUSE - VIOLATION OF PARKING ORDINANCE
AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE- The defendant parallel parked his automobile at
a street curbing. The plaintiff thereafter parked his vehicle immediately
behind that of the defendant making it impossible for the defendant to ex-
tricate his automobile. After waiting ten minutes and failing to find a police-
man, the defendant finally backed up and moved forward several times with
considerable force. The defendant succeeded in moving plaintiff's vehicle back-
wards several feet but also did considerable damage to the front end of the
plaintiff's car. Plaintiff brought suit. The lower court gave judgment for
the defendant. On appeal, it was held the fact that the plaintiff violated a
District of Columbia parking ordinance requiring three feet of clearance
between cars did not justify the lower court in holding that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence per se. The plaintiff assumed the risk of
having his car damaged accidentally but lie could not be called upon to an-
ticipate that defendant would repeatedly back into his vehicle with such force.
A reversal was ordered. Conn v. Hillard, 82 A.2d 368 (D.D.C. 1951).
A municipal corporation, acting under the residuary powers of the state,'
may establish the conduct of a reasonable man by ordinance.2 When enacted
within the defined limitations, such ordinances have the same force as a
statute enacted by the legislature and are similarly construed by the courts.-
It is through such expressed 4 and implied 5 authority, emanating from the
state legislature, that municipalities have regulated traffic and the use of
the streets within the corporate limits. Without exception, the basis for such
ordinances is to protect the public, as a class, from a particular harm.' Ac-
cordingly the moving party is not held liable for the violation of an ordinance
unless the harm suffered was of the kind which the enactment was intended
to prevent,7 and the injured a member of the class protected. 8 The violation
1. E.g. N.D. Rev. Code §40-0501 (1943): "The governing body of a municipality shall
have the power: 1. To enact or adopt all such ordinances . . . not repugnant to the
constitution and laws of this state, as may be proper and necessary to carry into effect
the powers granted to the municipality .. "
2. Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 523, 23 N.W. 237 (1895); Restatement, Torts §285,
comment (b); Prosser, Torts 264 (1941).
3. See e.g. Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 328, 23 N.W. 237, 239 (1885): "An ordinance
which a municipal corporation is authorized to make, is as binding on all persons within
the corporate limits as any statute or other laws of the commonwealth .. ."
4. E.g. N.D. Rev. Code §40-0501 (17) (1943): "To regulate traffic and sales upon
the streets, sidewalks, and public places;"; §40-0501 (18) "To regulate the speed of
vehicles and locomotives within the limits of the corporation;" §40-0502 (14) "To -egu-
late, control or restrict within designated zones or congested traffic districts, the use of
the streets.
5. See note 1, supra.
6. Meincke v. Oakland Garage, 11 Cal.2d 255, 79 P.2d 91 (1937) (jaywalking was
a violation of an ordinance); Leek v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 20 Cal. App.2d 374,
66 P.2d 1232 (1937) (walking against red light in violation of an ordinance); Prosser,
Torts 269-270 (1941).
7. Klotz v. Tru-Fruit Distributors, 173 So. 592 (La. 1937) (parking a truck by a
hydrant, in violation of an ordinance, was not causal connection for bicyclist's injury when
struck by a suddenly and negligently opened truck door); Elliott v. Montgomery, 135 Me.
372, 197 Atl. 322 (1938) (parking a truck on left side of street, in violation of an ordi-
nance, is not causal connection to a collision caused by the driver being blinded by the
sun); R6statement, Torts §286 comment (h).
8. Swift v. City of New York, 270 N.Y. 162, 200 N.E. 681 (1936) (ordinance re-
quiring barriers around excavations in streets was enacted for protection of travellers
on the streets, not to protect playing children); Folds v. City Council of Augusta, 40. Ca.
App. 827, 151 S.E. 685 (1930) pedestrian injured by truck, the driver violating an
ordinance which sets out rules of operation).
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of an ordinance, however, can be asserted both as a defense, as well as, the
basis for an action,9 1 since the enacting body established the conduct of a
reasonable man by ordinance. Thus the plaintiff's duty to exercise reasonable
care for his own safety is coexistent with the defendant's duty toward the
plaintiff.
The courts are in conflict upon the question of whether an ordinance viola-
tion is negligence per se or merely evidence of negligence °10 Most courts
seem, however, to have adopted the view that a violation constitutes negli-
gence per se,1 1 but some few jurisdictions still consider an infraction of a
safety ordinance as merely evidence of negligence.12 The prevailing view
has been criticized in that it is improper to presume that a civil liability
can be inferred from the violation of a duty imposed by statute. 13 A further
criticism has been that a municipality, enacting traffic ordinances, does not
possess the authority to create new civil rights.t4 Such a view is, however,
largely nullified because to deny a civil remedy is to ignore the court's obli-
gation to give the fullest effect to the intent and policy of the legislating
body. 15 This appears eminently logical since traffic ordinances and statutes,
which establish the rules of the road, are enacted principally to prevent injury
to all motorists, and frequently others.
In the instant case, the court stated that although the plaintiff parked his
vehicle illegally he could not be held to have anticipated the defendant's
subsequent actions. The defendant's actions were for this reason considered
as constituting an intervening act, and the plaintiff's ordinance violation as
not being the proximate cause of his injury. The court's strict limitation as
to what are foreseeable circumstances seems inconsistent with an earlier
9. Tilbury v. Powell, 191 Okla. 435, 130 P.2d 830 (1942) (plaintiff failed to display
a red light on his vehicle, also failed to pull over to the curb when stopping); McBride v.
Gill, 15 So.2d 643 (La. 1943) (plaintiff was exceeding the residential speed limit);
Richards v. Pass, 277 Mass. 372, 178 N.E. 643 (1931) (plaintiff and defendant both
violated different ordinances); Meincke v. Oakland Garage, 11 Cal.2d 255, 79 P.2d 91
(1937) (plaintiff was jaywalking in violation of an ordinance) (the court applied the
following test: "These facts are clear: (1) That plaintiff was violating an ordinance de-
signed to prevent the very character or type of injury which plaintiff received; (2) that
the violation of this ordinance continued to the very moment of impact; and (3) that
the injury wound not have occurred if plaintiff had not been violating "he ordinance.");
Restatement, Torts §469.
10. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) "Courts have been reluc-
tant to hold that the police regulation of boards and councils and other subordinate offi-
cials create rights of action beyond the specific penalties imposed. This has led them to
say that the violation of a statute is negligence, and the violation of a like ordinance is only
evidence of negligence . . . the distinction has not escaped criticism."
11. Danzansky v. Zimbolist, 105 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Folds v. City Council of
Augusta, 40 Ga. App. 827, 151 S.E. 685 (1930); White v. North Carolina R. Co., 216 N.C.
79, 3 S.E.2d. 310 (1939); Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N.W. 237 (1885) (first case
in Minnessota which clearly held that a violation of an ordinance constitutes negli-
gence per se).12. McBride v. Gill, 15 So.2d 643 (La. 1943); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lee,
10 La. App. 763, 123 So. 137 ('1929); accord, Oklahoma Producing & Refining Corp. v.
Freeman, 88 Okla. 166, 212 Pac. 742 (1923) (driving on the wrong side of the street,
in violation of a city ordinance, is prima facie evidence of negligence).
13. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361,
364 (1932).
14. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 320-321 (1914).
15. Id. at 341-343; also see Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920):
"By the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit wilfully, or heedlessly, the safeguards pre-
scribed by law for the benefit of another that he may be preserved in life or limb, is to
fall short of the standard of diligence to which those who live in organized society are
under a duty to conform."
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District of Columbia decision. 1 6 In that case it was held that the violation
.of an ordinance, by leaving the key in a parked vehicle, was the proximate
cause of an injury resulting from the unauthorized and negligent use of the
vehicle by another. In the instant case, the ordinance, requiring that a three-
foot space be maintained between parked vehicles, was undoubtedly enacted
to facilitate parking, and prevent the identical situation from arising: in which
the present defendant found himself. The quaere arises as to whether or
not the court here has largely nullified the ordinance which was obviously




BAILMENT - LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ON STORAGE RECEIPT - APPLICABIL-
ITY TO SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO REPAIR - REMEDY OF INSURER. Plaintiff
.insurance company, as subrogee, brought an action to recover the value of
a fur coat that was lost or stolen while in possession of the defendant furrier,
-who had contracted to store and repair it. Aware of the coat's $2000 insured
value, defendant suggested to the owner that a minimum value of $100 be
placed upon it to avoid further insurance. The owner agreed and a storage
receipt specifying the $100 valuation was issued, and liability limited to that
amount. After being repaired, the coat disappeared on the way to the cold
storage vaults. Plaintiff paid the owner the full $2000 valuation and sought
recovery against the defendant on the ground that there were two contracts,
that defendant was negligent under the alteration contract, thereby rendering
inapplicable the liability limitation in the contract for storage. On appeal from
a judgment in favor of the defendant, it was held that plaintiff was limited
to the $100 valuation. A dissenting opinion adhered to the theory that two
separate bailment contracts were executed, and that the limitation in the
storage contract had no application to the bailment for repairs. Lumbermen's
Mutual Insurance Co. v. F. Z. Cikra, Inc. 95 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 1950).
The majority opinion disregarded the element of separate contracts solely
on the validity of the receipt limiting the liability of the bailee to the specified
$100. The dissent logically points out that the storage contract never became
effective because the coat never reached storage, and also that payment for
repairs was separate from and in addition to the payment for storage, therefor,
the limitation could not be effective. In contending for liability for the full
value the dissent relied upon a former Ohio case.1
Although it has been contended to the contrary, 2 bailment is generally con-
ceded to be a contractual relationship.2 Indirectly, a bailment may be said
to be the rightful possession of goods by one who is not the owner, that the
16. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C.Cir. 1943).
17. Defendant in this instant case could possibly have counter claimed. See Harnick v.
Levine, 106 N.Y.S. 460 (1st Dist. 1951) (where motorist unable to extricate his vehicle
because the defendant had double parked, in violation of a city ordinance, brought suit
and was allowed recovery for discomfort and inconvenience).
1. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Higbee Co., 80 Ohio App. 437, 76 N.E.2d 404
(1947), rev'd. on other grounds.
2. Paton, Bailment: Property or Contract? 23 Aust. L.J. 591 (1950).
3. Story, Bailments 5 (9th ed. 1878).
